Governance 101¶
ELI5: veForge lets you lock TARE for up to 4 years to get voting power that decays over time. You vote on gauges to steer Keep's capital and earn USDC bribes from Coil fees.
Vote escrow (ve)¶
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Lock | Send TARE to VotingEscrow for a chosen duration |
| veTARE | Voting power — more time locked = more power |
| Decay | Power decreases linearly until unlock |
| Epoch | Weekly boundary (Thu 00:00 UTC) when gauge weights apply |
Analogy: long-term shareholder voting — longer commitment = louder voice.
Gauges & bribes¶
- GaugeController — registers gauges, tallies votes per epoch.
- GaugeWeightRouter — reads votes, calls Keep
set_allocations(onlyALLOCATOR_ROLE). - BribeDistributor — Coil USDC fees to voters who supported the fee gauge.
Votes do not move user collateral or mint TARE. They only retilt already-deployable capital within strategy max_debt caps.
flowchart LR
Lock[Lock TARE] --> Vote[Vote on gauges]
Vote --> GC[GaugeController]
GC --> GWR[GaugeWeightRouter]
GWR --> Keep[Keep allocations]
CoilFees[Coil USDC fees] --> Bribes[BribeDistributor]
Bribes --> Voters[Voters]
Flywheel connection¶
- FLYWHEEL 2.0: TARE surplus emission slice goes to Keep, not veForge emissions — but voters still earn Coil fee bribes.
- Governance steers Keep; Keep market-makes on Coil; Coil fees return to Keep and voters.
See veForge hub.
What can go wrong¶
Governance limits
- Votes cannot fix a malicious admin on Keep — separate trust boundary.
- Vote cooldown (10 days per user/gauge) limits rapid flipping.
- Bribe claims use frozen epoch snapshots — flash-loan vote manipulation mitigated.