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Governance 101

ELI5: veForge lets you lock TARE for up to 4 years to get voting power that decays over time. You vote on gauges to steer Keep's capital and earn USDC bribes from Coil fees.

Vote escrow (ve)

Term Meaning
Lock Send TARE to VotingEscrow for a chosen duration
veTARE Voting power — more time locked = more power
Decay Power decreases linearly until unlock
Epoch Weekly boundary (Thu 00:00 UTC) when gauge weights apply

Analogy: long-term shareholder voting — longer commitment = louder voice.

Gauges & bribes

  • GaugeController — registers gauges, tallies votes per epoch.
  • GaugeWeightRouter — reads votes, calls Keep set_allocations (only ALLOCATOR_ROLE).
  • BribeDistributor — Coil USDC fees to voters who supported the fee gauge.

Votes do not move user collateral or mint TARE. They only retilt already-deployable capital within strategy max_debt caps.

flowchart LR
    Lock[Lock TARE] --> Vote[Vote on gauges]
    Vote --> GC[GaugeController]
    GC --> GWR[GaugeWeightRouter]
    GWR --> Keep[Keep allocations]
    CoilFees[Coil USDC fees] --> Bribes[BribeDistributor]
    Bribes --> Voters[Voters]

Flywheel connection

  • FLYWHEEL 2.0: TARE surplus emission slice goes to Keep, not veForge emissions — but voters still earn Coil fee bribes.
  • Governance steers Keep; Keep market-makes on Coil; Coil fees return to Keep and voters.

See veForge hub.

What can go wrong

Governance limits

  • Votes cannot fix a malicious admin on Keep — separate trust boundary.
  • Vote cooldown (10 days per user/gauge) limits rapid flipping.
  • Bribe claims use frozen epoch snapshots — flash-loan vote manipulation mitigated.