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Third-party audit scope

ELI5: Package for an external auditor — every contract, seam, invariant, and known internal finding in one place. Submit this with source access before mainnet.

Engagement goal

Prove the four-protocol FLYWHEEL 2.0 stack is safe to deploy on Ethereum mainnet at the parameter envelope in mainnet parameters. Focus on composition (cross-repo routers) as much as single-contract logic.

In-scope contracts (14 + routers)

# Contract Repo Source Value path?
1 TareToken TARE-Stablecoin src/tare_token.vy Yes (minter set)
2 TareEngine TARE-Stablecoin src/tare_engine.vy Yes (CDP)
3 sTARE TARE-Stablecoin src/stare.vy Yes (saver funds)
4 SurplusSplitter TARE-Stablecoin src/SurplusSplitter.vy Yes (skim path)
5 CoilFeeRouter TARE-Stablecoin src/CoilFeeRouter.vy No (earned fees only)
6 PegKeeper TARE-Stablecoin src/peg_keeper.vy Yes (unbacked mint cap)
7 AuctionHouse TARE-Stablecoin src/auction_house.vy Yes (seized collateral)
8 Coil Coil-DEX src/Coil.vy No (settlement)
9 MultiStrategyVault khomdev-keep src/MultiStrategyVault.vy Yes (depositor TVL)
10 CoilMakerStrategy khomdev-keep src/strategies/CoilMakerStrategy.vy Yes
11 Fallback strategies khomdev-keep src/strategies/*.vy Yes
12 VotingEscrow khomdev-veforge src/VotingEscrow.vy No
13 GaugeController + GaugeWeightRouter khomdev-veforge src/*.vy Partial (allocations)
14 BribeDistributor + EmissionRouter khomdev-veforge src/*.vy No (bribe accounting)

Out of scope: AGENTS_FLYWHEEL/ (read-only agents), tribute/, SnekSentry/, off-chain Rust solver (review separately if in engagement).

Core invariant (must hold)

No vote, keeper, admin, or caller may move a solvent user's collateral, mint on a bad price, or alter live debt. Routers only move value already released or earned.

See Core invariant. Scope limit: TareEngine only — Keep STRATEGY_MANAGER is a separate depositor-risk surface.

Composition seams (priority review)

ID Seam Risk
S1 Coil → CoilFeeRouter → CoilMaker / BribeDistributor / surplus Mis-wiring wastes yield; bare vault transfer doesn't credit total_idle
S2 Engine surplus → SurplusSplitter → sTARE + CoilMaker Wrong emission_sink strands TARE
S3 GaugeController → GaugeWeightRouter → Keep set_allocations COMP-2: allocator cannot add strategies
S4 CoilMaker → Coil EIP-1271 intents Solver drain vs maker_margin_bps floor (H-2)
S5 PegKeeper + CurveTAREStrategy on shared pool Keeper mint on bad EMA; strategy LP shifts pool balance
S6 PegKeeper unbacked mint Dilution up to debt_ceiling

Diagram: Composition seams.

Threat model highlights

  1. Oracle manipulation — Chainlink staleness/deviation halts; Curve EMA used for peg keeper gate and CoilMaker floor.
  2. Solver / keeper trust — Whitelist solver holds inventory; keepers are permissionless but operational.
  3. Admin compromise — Keep strategy manager can repoint depositor capital; must be timelock/multisig on mainnet.
  4. CDP cascade — Liquidation bonus 10%, bad debt → surplus burn then total_bad_debt.
  5. Governance override — GaugeController.change_gauge_weight bypasses voters.

Internal pre-audit artifacts (provide to auditor)

Artifact Location
Stateful fuzz ./script/nightly_fuzz.sh across four submodules
Composition auditor AGENTS_FLYWHEEL/agents/security/composition_auditor/
Deploy verifier AGENTS_FLYWHEEL/agents/security/deploy_verifier/
StressSim adversarial economics AGENTS_FLYWHEEL/agents/security/stresssim/
Per-protocol SECURITY.md / SPEC.md Each submodule root

Known internal findings (verify fixed before audit sign-off)

ID Topic Status
TARE-7 CoilFeeRouter.max_swap_in mandatory Fixed in source; verify live bytecode
TARE-8 Keep admin on value path Deployment config — timelock required
COMP-2 Gauge router ALLOCATOR_ROLE only Implemented
FMR-002 CoilFeeRouter keep deposit path Fixed FLYWHEEL 2.0
H-2 CoilMaker spread floor vs hostile solver maker_margin_bps default 100
CDP deploy add_collateral threshold assert Verify on deployed engine bytecode
M-1/M-2 CoilMaker harvest cap / depeg exit Params at deploy

Run StressSim Scenario 3 (CDP) and Scenario 5 (solver drain) as regression proofs.

Launch envelope (auditor should bound-check)

Parameters in config/mainnet-params.toml:

  • Coil fee_bps ≤ 100 (1%)
  • keep_bps + gauge_bps ≤ 5000 (50%)
  • emission_bps ≤ 3000 (30% to CoilMaker; ≥70% to sTARE)
  • PegKeeper debt_ceiling sized to pool depth
  • max_swap_in on CoilFeeRouter and CoilMaker set before harvest enabled

Deliverables requested from auditor

  1. Report covering all in-scope contracts + seams above
  2. Severity-rated findings with exploit paths
  3. Confirmation of invariant scope (engine vs Keep)
  4. Sign-off or explicit blockers before mainnet deploy
  5. Optional: Rust solver (Coil-DEX/solver/) review for settlement math parity

Pre-audit checklist (protocol team)

  • [ ] Fresh mainnet deploy from audited commit (no stale Sepolia bytecode)
  • [ ] deploy_verifier GO on mainnet manifest (pre-launch script)
  • [ ] Timelock/multisig owns all value_path admin roles
  • [ ] nightly_fuzz green on audit commit
  • [ ] StressSim worst-case report archived in reviews/
  • [ ] Keeper fleet documented and tested on Sepolia (keepers README)

See also Audit status and Trust model.