VotingEscrow

ELI5: Deposit TARE for a chosen lock period (up to 4 years). Longer lock = more voting power that slowly decreases until unlock.

What you can do

Function	Effect
create_lock(amount, unlock_time)	New lock
increase_amount	Add TARE to lock
increase_unlock_time	Extend lock
withdraw	After unlock, retrieve TARE

Flywheel fit

Governance input token for gauge votes → Keep allocations + bribe eligibility.

Contract walkthrough

VotingEscrow.vy — Curve-style ve mechanics:

• Linear decay of voting power from lock time to unlock
• MAXTIME bounded [1 week, 4 years] at deploy
• checkpoint() updates global and user vote bias/slope
• create_lock_with_permit forwards ERC-2612 permit on TARE — VE does not implement its own permit

def create_lock(_value: uint256, _unlock_time: uint256):
    # Pull TARE, update slopes, mint ve balance
    ...

balanceOf(addr, t) — voting power at timestamp t via slope integration.

flowchart LR
    TARE[TARE token] --> VE[VotingEscrow]
    VE --> vePower[veTARE voting power]
    vePower --> GC[GaugeController.vote]

What can go wrong

Risks

• Locked TARE illiquid until unlock (no early exit).
• TARE price risk while locked.
• Fee-on-transfer / rebasing TARE not supported.

Source: khomdev-veforge/src/VotingEscrow.vy